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Equity: Conscience Goes to Market
by Irit Samet1
LUKE DEVINE2
IN FIRST-YEAR CONTRACT LAW, I was mildly bemused to learn that from

approximately the fourteenth to nineteenth century, England found itself with
two separate court systems dispensing two separate bodies of law. Tere was the
familiar, predictable Common Law, and then there was “Equity,” dishing out
relief to deserving parties as a matter of good “conscience.”3 To the green law
student who expected this profession to provide hardline rules, Equity’s doctrines
appeared annoyingly vague. Further, it seemed incongruous with the rule of law
(ROL) that, even after the fusion of the two court systems, Equity endured as a
doctrinally distinct body of law.
It is this uncharitable view of Equity, however, which Dr. Irit Samet4 sets
out to counter in her recent book, Equity: Conscience Goes to Market. In less
than 250 pages, Samet argues convincingly that Equity, with all its fuzzy and
1.
2.
3.

4.

(Oxford University Press, 2019) [Equity].
JD Candidate (2021) at Osgoode Hall Law School.
Samet notes that she uses the capitalized term “Common Law” to refer to the “law dispensed
by the common law courts as distinguished from the specifc ‘equitable’ interventions by the
Lord Chancellor and the Court of Chancery.” Supra note 1 at 21. It would appear, however,
that she sometimes uses the term as a catch-all for law (including judge-made law and
statutory law) minus equity. See e.g. ibid, s 1.2.2.
Dr. Irit Samet is a Professor in the Dickson Poon School of Law at King’s College London,
where she teaches courses on property law, equity, and trusts. She has published numerous
papers on the topic of equitable doctrines, and she recently co-edited a book on Equity’s
philosophical foundations. She studied law and English literature in Israel and holds a
Doctorate of Philosophy from the University of Oxford.
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morally-laden maxims, serves an important function in our legal system, and
should remain independent from its rule and clarity obsessed Common Law
counterpart. It is precisely Equity’s open-ended application of conscience, Samet
contends, which allows it to promote “Accountability Correspondence”: the
normative principle that legal liability should, where possible, converge with
moral responsibility.5
Equity is a refreshingly bold piece of legal theory. Samet’s central thesis
kicks against the historical and intuitive bend toward fusion, and her supporting
arguments often run counter to the current ideological climate—Samet, for
instance, rejects moral relativism and anchors her model of Equity in moral
objectivism.6 Te book is analytically rigorous but surprisingly accessible; for
anyone somewhat interested in the relationship between law and morality, Equity
makes for an enjoyable read. On this point, Samet deserves credit for breaking up
the monotony of her extensive analysis with incisive quotes and metaphors that
are, surprisingly, as illuminating as they are creative.7
As is often the case with more daring projects, however, Equity leaves itself
vulnerable to signifcant criticism. After laying out Samet’s thesis, I will turn my
attention to some of the book’s weaknesses: namely, its unpalatable characterization
of the Common Law; its ahistorical orientation; and its over-abundant faith
in the capacity of judges to properly administer and keep separate Equity and
Common Law. Despite these faws, however, I insist above all that Samet’s book
constitutes an important contribution to the study of Equity: one which, given
its readability and provocative argument, will likely cultivate greater interest in
this somewhat esoteric subject. Equity scholars and legal theory enthusiasts are
therefore indebted to Samet for Equity’s originality and accessibility.

I. IN DEFENCE OF EQUITY
Equity’s detractors fall into two camps: “fusionists”—those who would let the
Common Law absorb Equity and recast its doctrines in more technical language;
and “sceptics”—those who view Equity as dangerously subjective and would cast
it away entirely.8 In countering these arguments, Samet orients her defence of
Equity with two higher-order legal ideals: the ROL, which seeks to curtail the

5.
6.
7.
8.

Samet, supra note 1 at 28.
Ibid at 205-07.
See e.g. ibid at 112 (describing equity as the “Flangeless wheel”).
Ibid at 1-10.
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arbitrary exercise of power; and Accountability Correspondence, which seeks to
conjoin legal liability and moral responsibility.
While both ideals are equally important, anti-Equity scholars tend to
ignore Accountability Correspondence and subscribe to an overly-formalistic
conception of the ROL, whereby predictability and clarity are the only relevant
considerations when assessing the legitimacy of law.9 Under this framework,
no matter how morally repugnant a given law may be, it is perfectly legitimate if it
is intelligible to all interested parties and if one is able to predict, with reasonable
certainty, how a court would apply it. In this context, Equity is considered
reprehensible because its very purpose seems to be undermining predictability in
the Common Law. Equity, to be sure, has historically intervened in those cases
where the mechanical application of crystal-clear legal rules would lead to an
“unconscionable” outcome.10
For Samet, however, this external injection of moral values is necessary to
preserve the community’s trust in the legal system. When left unchecked, the
Common Law’s fxation with bright-line rules gives rise to an industry of “creative
compliance,” whereby well-resourced and well-informed actors “take shelter”
behind formal requirements to get away with morally dubious practices such as
aggressive tax avoidance. In this environment, Equity provides a necessary check
on the ROL-focused pursuit of form over substance. Te equitable doctrines
of proprietary estoppel, fduciary duty, and “clean hands” all implore courts,
to varying degrees, to factor “conscionability” into its analysis. Samet illustrates
her argument with reference to the egregious example set by Enron, the American
energy company which meticulously exploited regulatory rules and gaps to hide
its real fnancial situation, committing accounting fraud in the most compliant
manner possible.11 Under Samet’s model, Enron, try as it might, cannot maneuver
around “conscionability” without genuinely acting in good faith.
Equity, then, derives much of its strength from its morally charged language,
the potency of which Samet fears would be lost if recast in more technical terms.12
9.

For Samet’s discussion of the Chancellor’s foot critique of equity, see ibid, s 1.1.2. See
also ibid at section 1.1.3.1 (“Te two critiques of Equity we attended to above (i.e. fusion
and Chancellor’s foot) aim to fesh out (what its critics see as) the bankruptcy of this
approach as it begets norms that fail to realize the fundamental legal virtue of compliance
with the demands of the ROL…Te Chancellor’s foot critique…is more concerned
with the retrospectivity (3) and obscurity (4) that (allegedly) typifes the norms of
Equity” (ibid at 19)).
10. Ibid at 14.
11. Ibid, s 1.2.2.
12. Ibid.
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Further, “conscionability,” as Samet understands it, is not as unpredictable as its
critics might suggest.13 We all have a conscience, and we all recognize that it gives
rise to certain moral duties. For Samet, these duties are objective in the sense that
they can be discovered through reference to a society’s shared morals and mores.
“Te conscionability standard,” Samet observes, “invites the court to delve into a
pool of shared morality, and scoop out the answer to the question: ‘What was the
moral duty of the defendant in the circumstances?’”14

II. THE COMMON LAW—DEVOID OF MORAL
DELIBERATION?
Samet’s sharp contrast between Equity and Common Law—whereby Common
Law is formalist, fxated on bright-line rules, and Equity is morally substantive,
interested in upholding open-ended standards—is superfcially alluring.15 I am not
convinced, however, that this dichotomy can hold up to scrutiny. Indeed, it seems
to me that the Common Law is often just as fxated on open-ended standards,
and concerned with the conscientious resolution of issues, as is Equity.
To demonstrate her point that the Common Law is formalist and
rule-obsessed, Samet points to various bulky statutes and generally statute-heavy
areas of law like tax and consumer protection.16 It is not very surprising, however,
that legislation often produces a lengthy list of hardline rules—it would indeed
be absurd if statutes simply codifed a few general principles. What is more
telling, in my view, is that Samet is markedly quiet on the role of bright-line rules
in judge-made law. In fact, she fails to make a compelling case that judge-made
law is fxated on rules, and therefore paints an unconvincing picture of the
overwhelming favouritism for rules over standards in the Common Law.17
Tere is a broader methodological issue at play here as well. Samet
is a British-based academic, but she does not limit her analysis to any single
jurisdiction. While this enables her to draw on examples across a wide array
of jurisdictions that support her thesis, it also makes it easier for her critics to
counter her arguments with local nuances. Consider, for example, the Supreme
Court of Canada’s conceptualization of the duty of good faith in contract law.
In Bhasin v. Hrynew, the Court recognized for the frst time a common-law duty
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

For a discussion of conscionability, see ibid, s 1.4.
Ibid at 57.
Ibid at 28, 66.
Ibid at 38.
See e.g. ibid at 33.
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to act honestly in the performance of contractual obligations: “Tat organizing
principle is simply that parties generally must perform their contractual duties
honestly and reasonably and non-capriciously or arbitrarily.”18 Here, the duty
of good faith articulated by the Court does not rest on bright-line rules at all.
Indeed, the duty to act “honestly” and “reasonably” could just as easily be recast
as a duty to act in “good conscience.”
In my view, the role of “good faith” in contract law undermines Samet’s claim
that the moral potency of Equity would be lost if its principles were absorbed by
the Common Law. Te Common Law, at least through the Supreme Court of
Canada, has proven itself capable of giving efect to open-ended standards of
behaviour while also preserving their moral tenor. And that this would be the
case seems intuitively obvious. To paraphrase my frst-year Contracts professor,
“Never forget that judges want to sleep well at night!” Indeed, if Samet is correct
that Equity alone cares about conscience and morality, then beyond defending
the independence of Equity, we ought to be ringing alarm bells about the current
state of our legal system.

III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS—HISTORY, GOD, AND JUDGES
AS MORAL ARBITERS
Tough I am wary of criticizing an author for not doing what they explicitly
decided not to do, it seems to me that a more detailed discussion of Equity’s
origins in history would better ground Samet’s analysis. It is difcult to appreciate
the ingenuity of Samet’s take on the role of conscience in Equity without a
brief synopsis of how the relationship between conscience and Equity has been
interpreted in the past. Furthermore, in putting forward a theory of conscience
based on Immanuel Kant’s model of objective morality,19 I could not help but feel
that Samet (too conveniently) brushed aside Equity’s deeply theological origins.
Tough she briefy acknowledges that “conscience,” as it appeared in medieval
Equity theory, was interchangeable with God, she suggests that “conscience”
is now best understood with reference to a community-based set of objective
moral norms.20 If precedent plays any role in the law of Equity, I think judges
may be more sluggish to make that conceptual leap.
Nonetheless, society or social convention is, then, the rather paradoxical
source for Samet’s model of objective morality in Equity. Tough intriguing,
18. 2014 SCC 71 at para 63.
19. Samet, supra note 1 at 48.
20. For a discussion of conscience, see ibid, s 1.3.1.1.
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this model raises two issues: (1) given that social attitudes change over time, one
wonders how they can possibly constitute a source of objective morality; and (2)
setting the frst issue aside, why would judges, trained primarily in the Common
Law, be any better suited than you or my neighbour to divine and apply the
relevant moral truths in any given case? Samet set out ambitiously to defend
the separation of Common Law and Equity, and for this she deserves credit.
But I am left wondering: Perhaps she should have gone even further, doubled
down, and argued for an institutional split as well. We could, for instance,
bring back the Court of Chancery, only this time we would pack it with secular
Equity Commissioners trained to act as the mediums and interpreters of society’s
collective conscience. Why not?

